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Abstract In the literature there are at least two main formal structures to deal with
situations of interactive epistemology: Kripke models and type spaces. As shown in
many papers (see Aumann and Brandenburger in Econometrica 36:1161–1180, 1995;
Baltag et al. in Synthese 169:301–333, 2009; Battigalli and Bonanno in Res Econ
53(2):149–225, 1999; Battigalli and Siniscalchi in J Econ Theory 106:356–391, 2002;
Klein and Pacuit in Stud Log 102:297–319, 2014; Lorini in J Philos Log 42(6):863–
904, 2013), both these frameworks can be used to express epistemic conditions for
solution concepts in game theory. The main result of this paper is a formal comparison
between the two and a statement of semantic equivalence with respect to two different
logical systems: a doxastic logic for belief and an epistemic–doxastic logic for belief
and knowledge. Moreover, a sound and complete axiomatization of these logics with
respect to the two equivalent Kripke semantics and type spaces semantics is provided.
Finally, a probabilistic extension of the result is also presented. A further result of the
paper is a study of the relationship between the epistemic–doxastic logic for belief
and knowledge and the logic STIT (the logic of “seeing to it that”) by Belnap and
colleagues (Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world, 2001).
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1 Introduction
In recent years many game theorists have focused on the epistemic part of play-
ing a game, taking explicitly into account the knowledge and beliefs of the players
involved in strategic interactions. The goal of the epistemic approach to game the-
ory is to study what are the players’ epistemic conditions that lead to solution
concepts. Indeed, there are few games (e.g., the Prisoners’ Dilemma) that do not
need any strategic reasoning about the others for a rational player to choose an
action. In most of the situations instead players have to take into consideration what
they think about the others’ actions and beliefs in order to choose an action. Fur-
thermore, we need to consider what a player thinks about the others in order to
assess her rationality. Strategic thinking comes out when the players reason about
the others’ actions, knowledge and beliefs, and epistemic game theory makes it
explicit.
In the literature there are at least twomain formal structures to dealwith situations of
interactive epistemology: Kripke models, mainly used in logic and computer science
Fagin et al. (1995), and type spaces, more common in economics and game theory
(Harsanyi 1967–1968). As shown in many papers, both these two frameworks can be
used to express epistemic conditions for solution concepts. For instance, in Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) epistemic conditions
for Nash equilibrium and extensive form rationalizability are shown by means of
type spaces, whereas in Baltag et al. (2009) and Lorini (2013) epistemic conditions
for backward induction and iterated weak dominance are expressed making use of
Kripke models. The issue we try to address here is to formally study the relationship
between these two structures, with a view to a possible broader communication and
closer interaction between the two communities, epistemic logic and epistemic game
theory.
Quite recently some steps have already been attempted towards this aim
(Battigalli and Bonanno (1999), Heifetz and Mongin (2001), Klein and Pacuit (2014),
Zvesper (2010)). In Heifetz and Mongin (2001) the authors are able to identify a
logical system sound and complete with respect to the class of type spaces based on
some modifications of Aumann’s system (Aumann 1995). Both these logical systems
are probabilistic, in the sense that they are expressed in a language with probabilistic
operators. Zvesper’s work instead starts from a qualitative version of type spaces, that
he names type-space models and shows that there is an isomorphism with Kripkean
state-space models.
The present work is connected with both these approaches. In Sect. 2, we start
by defining a qualitative multi-agent epistemic language with belief operators. Then,
we show firstly how to interpret it on a specific class of qualitative Kripke models,
that we call doxastic game models, and later how to interpret the same language on
probabilistic type spaces. Finally, we prove that the two frameworks are semantically
equivalent with respect to the language.
In Sect. 3, we extend the language by introducing knowledge operators, in order to
express two different epistemic attitudes in our frameworks. We show how to interpret
the extended language on type spaces and subsequently we define the corresponding
class of epistemic-doxastic game models. In the end we prove the semantic equiva-
lence between the two semantics with respect to the extended language. Consequently,
doxastic game models and epistemic-doxastic game models represent the qualitative
Kripkean counterpart of type spaces.
Section 4 is devoted to the axiomatizations of the logic of belief and of the logic of
belief and knowledge interpreted over doxastic game models and epistemic–doxastic
game models, respectively. Given the results on the semantic side, these two logics
are sound and complete with respect to type spaces too.
Section 5 presents a study of the relationship between such a logic of belief and
knowledge and the logic STIT (the logic of “seeing to it that”) byBelnap and colleagues
(2001). The point of this study consists in building a connection between the area of
epistemic logics and the area of logics of action.
We conclude in Sect. 6 by extending the analysis about the equivalence between
Kripke-style semantics and type space semantics for epistemic modal languages to a
modal language with probabilistic beliefs. The significance of this section consists in
showing that the equivalence between the two kinds of semantics is preserved when
moving from a qualitative representation of epistemic attitudes to a quantitative one
based on probabilities.
2 Models with belief
In this section wewill introduce the epistemic structures under consideration: doxastic
Kripke models and type spaces. As usual in logic, we start out by introducing a logical
language to talk about the epistemic interactive situation of the players in a game, and
in the end we interpret it on both doxastic models and type spaces.
2.1 Language
Let us be given a finite simultaneous-move game G = 〈N , (Ai , pii )i∈N 〉, with N the
set of players, and ∀i ∈ N a finite action set Ai and a payoff function pii . We want
to endow ourselves with a logical language to talk about the epistemic situation of
the players. We define the language LDGL(G) for the doxastic game logic (DGL) as
generated by the following grammar:
ϕ :: = pl(ai ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Biϕ
where ai ∈ Ai and i ∈ N . The other boolean operators∨,⊥,⊤,→ and↔ are defined
in the standard way. The language LDGL(G) is a doxastic language with a belief
operator Bi for each player i . Notice that the language LDGL(G), and consequently
the logic DGL, is parametrized by the game G that we are taking into consideration.
It is the game G that gives us the primitives pl(ai ) of our language LDGL(G): for
each ai ∈ Ai we have one primitive pl(ai ), read as “player i is playing her action
ai”. The doxastic formula Biϕ has to be read “player i believes that ϕ is true”. Let us
define the setsΦi :={pl(ai ) : ai ∈ Ai } andΦ:=
⋃
i∈N Φi . Moreover, let us abbreviate
B̂iϕ:=¬Bi¬ϕ.
2.2 Semantics
2.2.1 Doxastic models
In the epistemic logic literature it is standard to express the semantics of doxastic lan-
guages by means of structures called doxastic models. Doxastic models are a specific
type of Kripke models used in modal logic (Blackburn et al. 2001).
Definition 1 (Doxastic model) A doxasticmodel is a tuple M=〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉
where:
– W is a countable set of possible worlds;
– υ : W −→ P(Φ) is the valuation function for the set Φ of atomic facts defined
in Sect. 2.1 (with P(Φ) the power set of Φ);
– →i⊆ W×W is the belief relation of player i that satisfies the following conditions:
– seriality: ∀w∃w′ such that w →i w
′;
– transitivity: ∀u, w, z : u →i w and w →i z implies u →i z;
– Euclideaness: ∀u, w, z : w →i u and w →i z implies u →i z.
Let us define the belief set of player i at worldw as follows:→i(w):={w
′ : w →i w
′}.
Before interpreting LDGL(G) over doxastic models we are going to identify a
subclass of doxastic models, that we call doxastic game models DGM for game G.
A similar notion of doxastic game model is defined by Lorini and Schwarzentruber
(2010).
Definition 2 (Doxastic game model) A doxastic game model for the game G is a
doxastic model M = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 satisfying the following conditions:
– Adequate valuation condition (AVC):
∀i ∈ N , ∀w ∈ W, υi (w) is a singleton,
where υi (w) is the restriction of υ(w) to Φi , i.e., υi (w) = υ(w) ∩Φi ;
– Ex interim condition (ExIC):
∀i ∈ N , ∀w,w′ ∈ W, ∀ai ∈ Ai , if w →i w
′ and pl(ai ) ∈
υ(w) then pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w
′).
AVC simply says that the valuation function assigns one and only one action to each
player at each world, since we do not want to have worlds in which a player can play
two different actions at the same time. ExIC means that if a player plays an action,
then she believes to play that action. For this reason we call it ex interim condition: it
describes a stage in the game where the players have already chosen their own actions,
and they might be uncertain only about the others’ actions.
Doxastic game models of the form M = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 can be used to
provide a semantics for the languageLDGL(G). The following are the truth conditions
of formulas in the languageLDGL (G) relative to doxastic gamemodels,where M, w 
ϕ means that formula ϕ is true at world w in the model M :
– M, w  pl(ai ) iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w);
– M, w  ¬ϕ iff M, w  ϕ;
– M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M, w  ψ ;
– M, w  Biϕ iff ∀w
′ ∈ W, if w →i w
′ then M, w′  ϕ.
As usual we say that a formula ϕ is true in a model M = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉
if ∀w ∈ W, M, w  ϕ. Then, a formula ϕ is valid in DGM if ϕ is true in M for all
M ∈ DGM, and we write DG M ϕ. A formula ϕ is satisfiable in DGM if ¬ϕ is not
valid in DGM.
2.2.2 Type spaces
The formal structures mainly used in game-theoretic literature to express epistemic
situations in a game are type spaces, introduced inHarsanyi (1967)–1968. The classical
constructionof type spaces is inductive (seeBrandenburger andDekel 1993). Each type
ti of player i is associated with an action ai ∈ Ai = X
0
i and represents a hierarchy of
beliefs about the other players. The first level of the hierarchy is given by a probability
distribution x1i on the actions of the other players A−i = Π j =i A j = Π j =i X
0
j = X
0
−i ,
i.e., x1i ∈ ∆(X
0
−i ). Call this distribution x
1
i player i’s 1-order belief, and X
0
−i the
domain of player i’s 1-order beliefs. Then, anticipating the other players’ reasoning,
each player i will also form expectations about the other players’ beliefs about the
other players’ action profiles. Incorporating these into the formal account results in
a probability distribution x2i ∈ ∆(X
0
−i × Π j =i∆(X
0
− j )) over the strategy profiles
and the first-order beliefs of the other players, where X0−i × Π j =i∆(X
0
− j ) = X
1
−i
is the domain of player i’s 2-order beliefs. The process goes iteratively: the domain
of player i’s k + 1-order beliefs is defined as X k−i = X
k−1
−i × Π j =i∆(X
k−1
− j ), and a
k + 1-order belief of i is a probability distribution xk+1i ∈ ∆(X
k
−i ). Prima facie, if
k > h > 0 then player i’s k-order belief is more complex than player i’s h-order
belief. It was Harsanyi’s seminal contribution to see that this process catches itself at
infinity, in the sense that player i’s ω-order belief captures player i’s beliefs about the
entire hierarchies of beliefs of the other players (see Brandenburger and Dekel 1993;
Mertens and Zamir 1985). That is, a ω-order belief of player i contains information
about ω-order beliefs of the other players and not just about lower order beliefs of the
other players. This implies that a type of player i is associated with both an action
of player i and a probability distribution over the types of the others. Consequently,
every type ti ∈ Ti of player i can be mapped to an element of Ai and to an element
of ∆(T−i ), with T−i = Π j =i T j . Harsanyi’s characterization leads to the following
simplified definition of type spaces as given by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995):
Definition 3 (Type space) A type space T for game G = 〈N , (Ai , pii )i∈N 〉 is a tuple
〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1, . . . , σn〉, where:
– Ti is a countable set of types of player i ;
– βi : Ti −→ ∆(T−i ) is the belief function of player i that associates with each
type ti ∈ Ti a probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(T−i ) over the types of the others
T−i :=Π j =i T j ;
– σi : Ti −→ Ai is the action function of player i that associates an action ai ∈ Ai
with each type ti ∈ Ti .
1
An element t ∈ T is called state, where as usual T :=T1 × · · · × Tn . Given a state t ,
ti denotes the element in t corresponding to player i .
The truth conditions for formulas of the doxastic language LDGL(G) relative to a
probabilistic type space T = 〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1, . . . , σn〉 are given by the
following clauses. Note that formulas are evaluated at a given state t of a type spaceT :
– T , t  pl(ai ) iff σi (ti ) = ai ;
– T , t  ¬ϕ iff T , t  ϕ;
– T , t  ϕ ∧ ψ iff T , t  ϕ and T , t  ψ ;
– T , t  Biϕ iff ∀t
′ ∈ T if t ′i = ti and βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) > 0 then T , t
′  ϕ.
The truth condition of the doxastic operator Bi is justified by the way the notion
of belief is commonly defined in type spaces. A basic notion in the literature on
type spaces is the event. An event is a subset e ⊆ T . An event for player i is a
subset e−i ⊆ T−i . Let βi (ti )(e−i ) be the probability that type ti gives to the event
e−i = {t−i ∈ T−i : t−i ∈ e−i }, i.e.,
βi (ti )(e−i ) =
∑
t ′−i∈ e−i
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ).
Then, the event that player i believes e−i , denoted by Bi (e−i ), is defined in type
spaces as follows:
Bi (e−i ) = {t ∈ T : βi (ti )(e−i ) = 1}.
Intuitively, Bi (e−i ) is the set of states at which player i assigns probability 1 to the
event e−i . It is easy to check that T , t  Biϕ if and only if t ∈ Bi ({t
′
−i ∈ T−i :
T , 〈ti , t
′
−i 〉  ϕ}). In other words, player i believes ϕ at state t if and only if t belongs
to the set of states at which player i assigns probability 1 to set of states at which ϕ is
true.
The notions of validity and satisfiability for formulas of LDGL(G) relative to the
class T of type spaces are defined in the standard way, as for doxastic game models.
2.3 Correspondence
In this section we are going to formally prove what we claimed in the beginning,
namely that type spaces and doxastic game models are semantically equivalent with
respect to the language LDGL(G). The proof is developed in many steps and it will
proceed as follows. Firstly, we present a way to transform type spaces into doxastic
1 We are considering complete information games: the game structure and the payoff functions are common
knowledge among the players. Consequently, unlike Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) there is no need
to specify a payoff function for each type.
models, and in particular it turns out that the resulting doxastic models are doxastic
game models. Then, we show that the transformation preserves the truth of all the
formulas in LDGL(G). This gives us the first half of the proof, i.e., the result that if
a formula of LDGL(G) is satisfiable in type spaces, then it is satisfiable in doxastic
game models.
The second half of the proof will proceed symmetrically. Firstly we define a way to
transformdoxastic gamemodels into type spaces, thenweprove that the transformation
preserves the truth of all the formulas in LDGL(G). Consequently, we get the second
part of the result, i.e., that if a formula of LDGL(G) is satisfiable in doxastic game
models, then it is satisfiable in type spaces.
Starting from a given type spaceT = 〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1, . . . , σn〉we can
transform it into a doxastic game model MT = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 where:
– W = T is the set of worlds (unless differently specified, to ease the notation in
what follows we simply write w ∈ W for the world corresponding to state t ∈ T ,
w′ for the world corresponding to state t ′, w′′ for the world corresponding to state
t ′′, and so on);
– υ : W −→ P(Φ) is the valuation function, defined such that pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w) iff
σi (ti ) = ai ;
– →i is the belief relation of player i , defined as follows:w →i w
′ iff βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) >
0 and ti = t
′
i .
We have now to prove that any model obtained via this transformation is a doxastic
game model. It amounts to showing that any MT obtained via the transformation
satisfies AVC and ExIC.
Proposition 1 MT is a doxastic game model.
Proof It is straightforward to show that MT is a doxasticmodel, i.e., that MT satisfies
seriality, transitivity and Euclideaness. Then we prove that MT satisfies AVC and
ExIC.
(AVC). Since ∀i ∈ N , σi (ti ) = ai for a given ai ∈ Ai and ¬∃a
′
i ∈ Ai s.t. a
′
i =
ai and σi (ti ) = a
′
i , we have that M
T , w  pl(ai ) and ∀a
′
i ∈ Ai s.t. a
′
i =
ai , M
T , w  pl(a
′
i ). Then, for all w ∈ Wυi (w) is a singleton and AVC is satisfied.
(ExIC). In MT we have a world w ∈ W corresponding to each state t ∈ T .
It follows by definition of MT that if w′ ∈→i (w) then ti = t
′
i . Furthermore,
since each type ti is associated with a unique action ai ∈ Ai it follows that
if w →i w
′ and pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w) then pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w
′). Hence ExIC is satisfied. ⊓⊔
One might now wonder why we presented such a transformation among the
many possible ones. For instance, a plausible alternative could be to transform the
probability distribution into a qualitative ordering  in the following way: w i
w′ iff βi (t
′
i )(t
′
−i ) ≥ βi (ti )(t−i ) and ti = t
′
i . The reason for our choice, as we are going
to show in order to conclude the first half of the proof, is that our transformation
preserves the truth of all the formulas in our language LDGL(G). It means that the
two structures T and MT express the same epistemology with respect to the game
G taken into account. We can now formally prove this result.
Theorem 1 Let t ∈ T be a state in the type space T and w ∈ W the corresponding
world in the doxastic game model MT built from T . For any ϕ in LDGL(G), if
T , t  ϕ then MT , w  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ. We prove only some cases.
Induction basis: (ϕ = pl(ai )). Suppose T , t  pl(ai ). Then, by definition of υ we
have that MT , w  pl(ai ).
Inductive steps: (ϕ = Biψ). SupposeT , t  Biψ . Then,∀t
′ s.t. t ′i = ti and βi (ti )(t
′
−i )
> 0,T , t ′  ψ . By inductive hypothesis, MT , w′  ψ,∀w such thatw →i w
′, hence
MT , w  Biψ . ⊓⊔
The second half of the proof consists in the other direction: given an arbitrary
doxastic game model M it is always possible to associate with it a corresponding type
space T M . Furthermore, it holds that the doxastic game model M and the associated
type space T M are semantically equivalent with respect to the language LDGL(G).
Let us be given an arbitrary doxastic game model M = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉.
Firstly, we define the types in T M in the following way: for all w ∈ W we associate
a type ti of player i such that if→i(w) =→i(w
′) then→i(w) and→i(w
′) represent
the same type. Formally, Ti = {→i(w): w ∈ W }. Then for any given world w in M
we have a state t = (t1, . . . , tn) inT
M , defined by→1(w), . . . ,→n(w). We call t the
state corresponding to world w. Secondly, we associate with each type ti an action ai
specified by υ: σi (ti ) = ai iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w). By ExIC each type will be associated
with a unique action. Finally, we define the probability distribution βi (ti ) over T−i
by distinguishing two cases: the case in which the support suppti (βi ) = {t
′
−i ∈ T−i :
w →i w
′} is finite and the case in which suppti (βi ) is infinite. Let us define first the
finite case. For each i ∈ N , for each ti ∈ Ti and for each t
′
−i ∈ T−i , if suppti is finite
then:
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) =
{
1
|suppti
(βi )|
if t ′−i ∈ suppti (βi )
0 else
Let us now define the infinite case. For each i ∈ N , for each ti ∈ Ti and for each
t ′−i ∈ T−i , if suppti is infinite then:
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) =
{
1
2
f (t ′
−i
)
if t ′−i ∈ suppti (βi )
0 else
where f is a bijective functionwith domain suppti (βi ) and codomainN
+ = {1, 2, . . .}.
Since suppti (βi ) is countably infinite this function is well-defined and clearly
Σt ′−i∈suppti (βi )
1
2
f (t ′
−i
)
sums up to 1.
To sum up, given an arbitrary doxastic gamemodel M = 〈W,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉, we
can associatewith it the corresponding type spaceT M = 〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1,
. . . , σn〉 defined as follows:
– a type ti of player i for each→i(w): Ti = {→i(w) : w ∈ W };
– an action ai of ti specified by υ: σi (ti ) = ai iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w);
– a belief function βidefined as above.
Theorem 2 Let w ∈ W be a world of M and t ∈ T the corresponding state in the
type space T M built from M. For any ϕ in LDGL(G), if M, w  ϕ then T
M , t  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ. We prove only some cases.
Induction basis: (ϕ = pl(ai )). Suppose M, w  pl(ai ). Then, by definition of υ we
have that T M , t  pl(ai ).
Inductive steps: (ϕ = Biψ). Suppose M, w  Biψ . Consequently, M, w
′ 
ψ,∀w′ ∈→i (w). By inductive hypothesis, ∀t
′ s.t. t ′i = ti and βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) >
0,T M , t ′  ψ , hence T M , t  Biψ . ⊓⊔
The following corollary finally states that the class of type spaces T and the class of
doxastic gamemodelsDGM provide equivalent semanticswith respect to the language
LDGL(G).
Corollary 1 A formula ϕ of LDGL(G) is satisfiable in T iff it is satisfiable in DGM.
2
3 Models with belief and knowledge
In this section we want to extend our language to deal with more than one epistemic
attitude. A straightforward extension is to introduce another operator to represent
“knowledge” or “absolute certainty with no possibility at all for error”. We want to
show if and how we can interpret it on our structures, proving the same equivalence
result between type spaces and Kripke models with respect to the enriched language.
3.1 Language
Given a finite simultaneous-move gameG = 〈N , (Ai , pii )i∈N 〉, we define an extension
of our logic DGL, and we call it epistemic–doxastic game logic EDGL. The language
LE DGL(G) of EDGL is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ :: = pl(ai ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | Biϕ | ϕ
where ai ∈ Ai and i ∈ N .
The language LE DGL(G) is the doxastic game language LDGL(G) of DGL
extended by the knowledge operator Ki , and the universal operator, which turns out
to be useful for obtaining the axiomatization, as we will see in Sect. 4. Kiϕ is read as
“player i knows that ϕ is true”, whileϕ is read as “ϕ is universally true”. As before,
let us abbreviate the dual of Ki as K̂iϕ:=¬Ki¬ϕ and the dual of  as ♦ϕ:=¬¬ϕ.
2 In order to avoid further complications, here we limit ourselves to the countable case: countable type sets
and countable possible worlds set. However, our results generalize to the uncountable case by appropriately
endowing type sets Ti and T−i with σ -algebras, and by ensuring that every βi (ti ) is a measurable function,
as usual in type spaces literature (see Aumann and Brandenburger 1995, Sect. 6).
3.2 Semantics
3.2.1 Type spaces
In a similar way to what we did above we want to interpret our language LE DGL(G)
over a type space T as semantics. In order to do that, we simply need to add to
the previous list of clauses of Sect. 2.2.2 the following clauses for Ki -formulas and
-formulas:
– T , t  Kiϕ iff ∀t
′ ∈ T if t ′i = ti then T , t
′  ϕ;
– T , t  ϕ iff ∀t ′ ∈ T,T , t ′  ϕ.
Looking at these clauses, we can observe that the Ki -operator ranges over all the states
with the same type for player i , whereas the -operator ranges over all the states in
T . We will spend more words in Sect. 3.5 on the interpretation. In particular, although
the clause for Ki -formulas seems the obvious one for type spaces, we will see that it
is far from being uncontroversial and it will have important consequences on Kripke
models.
3.2.2 Epistemic–doxastic models
In the literature about Kripke models the semantics usually associated with epistemic–
doxastic languages with a Bi -operator and a Ki -operator are epistemic–doxastic
models, or just epistemic models for brevity (see Kraus and Lehmann 1988). Epistemic
models are nothing but multi-relational Kripke models commonly used in modal logic
(Blackburn et al. 2001).
Definition 4 (Epistemic–doxastic model) An epistemic–doxastic model is a tuple
M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 where:
– W is a countable set of possible worlds;
– υ : W −→ P(Φ) is the valuation function for the set Φ of atomic facts defined
in Sect. 2.1;
– ∼i is the epistemic accessibility relation of player i , that is an equivalence relation
over W ;
– →i⊆ W × W is the belief relation of player i which satisfies the following con-
ditions:
– seriality: ∀w∃w′ s.t. w →i w
′;
– →i⊆∼i ;
– ∀w,w′ ∈ W , if w ∼i w
′ then →i(w) ⊆→i(w
′).
Moreover, let us write ∼i(w) for the partition cell (also called “information set”) of
player i containing world w: ∼i(w):={w
′ ∈ W : w ∼i w
′}.
In order to interpret LE DGL(G) over epistemic models and to state a result of
semantic equivalence with respect to type spaces, we are going to identify a subclass
of epistemic models, that we call epistemic–doxastic game models, or just epistemic
game models EGM.
Definition 5 (Epistemic game model) Epistemic gamemodels are epistemic–doxastic
models satisfying the conditionsAVCandExICgiven inDefinition2, and the following
condition:
– Epistemic independence condition (EIC):
∼1(w1) ∩ . . .∩ ∼n(wn) = ∅ for every (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n .
Roughly speaking, EIC says that each player has no reason to rule out any possible
information set of the others specified in the model: if an information set of i is present
in the model, then the other players should not consider it impossible at any world.
Epistemic game models can be used to represent a semantics for the language
LE DGL(G). The semantic clauses are the same as for doxastic game models, plus the
following clauses for Ki -formulas and -formulas:
– M, w  Kiϕ iff ∀w
′ ∈ W if w ∼i w
′ then M, w′  ϕ;
– M, w  ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W, M, w′  ϕ.
As for DGM, we say that a formula ϕ is true in a model M if ∀w ∈ W, M, w  ϕ.
Then, a formula ϕ is valid in EGM (and we write EG M ϕ) if ϕ is true in M for all
M ∈ EGM, and a formula ϕ is satisfiable in EGM if ¬ϕ is not valid in EGM.
Wewant to point out also that the condition ExIC in epistemic gamemodels implies
that each player knows her own action. Thismakes sense, sincewe are describing an ex
interim stage of the game, where each player is already certain about her own choice.
This is expressed by the following validity:
Lemma 1 ∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,EG M pl(ai )→ Ki pl(ai ).
Proof By contradiction, suppose that M, w  pl(ai ) and that M, w  Ki pl(ai ).
Consequently, ∃u ∈∼i (w) s.t. M, u  pl(ai ). Hence, by AVC ∃a
′
i ∈ Ai s.t. a
′
i =
ai and M, u  pl(a
′
i ). By definition of→i we have that ifw ∼i u then →i(w) =→i
(u). It follows that ∀w′ ∈ W, if w′ ∈→i (w) then w
′ ∈→i (u) too. Then, by ExIC
M, w′  pl(ai ) and M, w
′  pl(a
′
i ). Contradiction with AVC. ⊓⊔
3.3 Correspondence
In this section we prove the semantic equivalence between type spaces and epistemic
game models with respect to the language LE DGL(G). The proof will proceed in the
same way as before, i.e., it will be divided into two parts and we will make use of a
transformation of one structure into the other in order to show the equivalence.
Given an arbitrary type spaceT , the corresponding epistemic–doxastic model MT
is defined as the tuple MT = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 where:
– W = T is the set of worlds;
– υ : W −→ P(Φ) is the valuation function such that pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w) iffσi (ti ) = ai ;
– ∼i is the accessibility relation of player i , given by: ∀w,w
′ ∈ W ,w ∼i w
′ iff ti =
t ′i . Then ∼i determines a partition over W ;
– →i is the belief relation of player i , defined as follows:w →i w
′ iff βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) >
0 and ti = t
′
i .
We have now to show that the epistemic–doxastic model we obtain via the trans-
formation is an epistemic game model, namely we have to show that it satisfies AVC,
ExIC and EIC.
Proposition 2 MT is an epistemic game model.
Proof The proof for AVC and ExIC is similar to Proposition 1. Here we only prove
that EIC holds too.
(EIC). Since T = T1 × · · · × Tn , each state t ∈ T has the form (t1, . . . , tn), and
∀ti∀t−i∃t s.t. t = (ti , t−i ). Denoting by ∼i (ti ) the partition cell corresponding to
type ti , it follows that ∀(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T∃w ∈ W s.t. ∼1 (t1) ∩ · · · ∩ ∼n (tn) = w.
Consequently,∼1(w1)∩ · · · ∩ ∼n(wn) = ∅ for every (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ W
n and EIC is
satisfied. ⊓⊔
Toconclude thefirst half of the proofwe show that this transformation into epistemic
gamemodels preserves the truth of all the formulas ofLE DGL (G). The proof is similar
to the previous one, so in this section we can just focus on the part for Ki -formulas
and -formulas.
Theorem 3 Let t ∈ T be a state in T and let w ∈ W be the corresponding world in
MT . For any ϕ in LE DGL(G), if T , t  ϕ then M
T , w  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ.
(ϕ = Kiψ). Suppose T , t  Kiψ . Then, ∀t
′ s.t. t ′i = tiT , t
′  ψ . By inductive
hypothesis, MT , w′  ψ,∀w′ ∈∼i(w), hence M
T , w  Kiψ .
(ϕ = ψ). SupposeT , t  ψ . Then, ∀t ′ ∈ T,T , t ′  ψ . By inductive hypothesis,
MT , w′  ψ,∀w′ ∈ W , hence MT , w  ψ . ⊓⊔
In the second part of the proof we are going to show the other direction: given
an arbitrary epistemic game model M it is always possible to associate with it a
corresponding type space T M . Moreover, it holds again that the epistemic game
model M and the associated type space T M are semantically equivalent with respect
to the language LE DGL(G).
Let us be given an arbitrary epistemic game model M . Firstly, we define a type
ti ∈ Ti for each i’s partition cell ∼i (w) in M : Ti = {∼i (w) : w ∈ W }. Notice that
when we have ∼i relations in the model this is equivalent to the definition of types
given for Theorem 2. Then by EIC, given n arbitrary partition cells, one for each
player, the intersection will always be non-empty. The worldsw in the intersection are
associated with the state t = (t1, . . . , tn), where types t1, . . . , tn are determined by the
partition cells ∼i(w) for all i : let us call t the state corresponding to those worlds w
in the intersection. Moreover, EIC guarantees that in T M the states T correspond to
the Cartesian product of type sets Ti , i.e. T = T1 × · · · × Tn . Secondly, we associate
with each type ti an action ai specified by υ: σi (ti ) = ai iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w). By
ExIC each type will be associated with a unique action. Finally, for each type ti
we define the probability distribution βi (ti ) over T−i in the same way as we did in
the proof of Theorem 2 by distinguishing two cases, the case in which the support
suppti (βi ) = {t
′
−i ∈ T−i : w →i w
′} is finite and the case in which it is infinite, with
w being the world in W associated with the type ti .
To sum up, taken an arbitrary M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉, we can
associate with it the corresponding type space T M = 〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1,
. . . , σn〉 defined as follows:
– a type ti of player i for each i’s partition cell∼i(w) in M : Ti = {∼i(w) : w ∈ W };
– an action ai of ti specified by υ: σi (ti ) = ai iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w);
– a belief function βi defined differently for the finite case and for the infinite case,
as before.
Theorem 4 Let w ∈ W be a world of M and t ∈ T the corresponding state in T M .
For any ϕ in LE DGL(G), if M, w  ϕ then T
M , t  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ.
(ϕ = Kiψ). Suppose M, w  Kiψ . Then, by definition M, w
′  ψ,∀w′ ∈∼i(w). By
inductive hypothesis, ∀t ′ s.t. t ′i = ti , T
M , t ′  ψ , hence T , t  Kiψ .
(ϕ = ψ). Suppose M, w  ψ . Then, by definition M, w′  ψ,∀w′ ∈ W . By
inductive hypothesis, ∀t ′ ∈ T, T M , t ′  ψ , hence T M , t  ψ . ⊓⊔
The following corollary then states that the class of type spaces T and the class
of epistemic game models EGM provide equivalent semantics with respect to the
language LE DGL(G).
Corollary 2 A formula ϕ of LE DGL(G) is satisfiable in T iff it is satisfiable in EGM.
3.4 Examples
We consider a two player game G = 〈Ann, Bob; AA = {U, D}, piA; AB =
{L , R}, piB〉. Then, an example of type space for G is pictured in Fig. 1.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the transformation into epistemic game models as defined
above. Arrows represent the belief relation: an arrow going from w to w′ means
w →i w
′. Coloured squares that partition the set of all possible worlds represent the
accessibility relation and each square corresponds to a type.
Notice that if we drop the ex interim condition we can represent a situation in
which players have not decided yet their actions and hence they do not know their
future action (Fig. 4). Indeed, Fig. 4 pictures an information set of Ann that contains
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Fig. 2 Transformation: Ann
(1U,1L)
(1U,2L)
(1U,1R)
(1U,2R)
(1D,1L) (1D,1R)
(1D,2L) (1D,2R)
(
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Fig. 3 Transformation: Bob
(1U,1L)
(2U,1L)
(1D,1L)
(2D,1L) (
( (
(1U,1R) (1D,1R)
2U,1R) (2D,1R)
(1U,2L) (1D,2L)
2U,2L) (2D,2L)
(1U,2R) (1D,2R)
2U,2R) (2D,2R)
both worlds where her action is U and worlds where her action is D: this means that
Ann is still uncertain about her choice of action.
3.5 Discussion
After having presented the equivalence results between the Kripkean semantics and
type space semantics for the qualitative epistemic languages of belief and knowledge,
we want to talk about two conceptual issues that are relevant here. First of all, we
spend some more words on the concept of knowledge introduced in Sect. 3. Secondly,
we briefly discuss the distinction between probabilistic (quantitative) type spaces and
qualitative type spaces.
3.5.1 On the knowledge operator
Onemightwonderwhywe introduced the operator Ki . In fact, only one basic epistemic
operator is normally introduced and used in type spaces: the probability 1-operator,
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Fig. 4 Transformation without
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that corresponds to the operator Bi . In economic literature this probability 1-operator
is sometimes called knowledge and sometimes belief (seeAumann andBrandenburger
1995; Brandenburger 2008). Indeed, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) write:
In this paper, “know” means “ascribe probability 1 to”. This is sometimes called
“believe”, while “know” is reserved for absolute certainty with no possibility at
all for error.
The reason why we introduced two different epistemic operators is related to that
observation. As mentioned in the previous quote, in (modal) epistemic literature there
are two different basic notions, knowledge and belief, that normally correspond to a
S5-operator and a KD45-operator. Then, it makes sense to try to express these two
different epistemic attitudes in both the structures we are dealing with, and to compare
their interpretations in parallel.
The most obvious thing to do if we want to represent in type spaces both epistemic
attitudes, absolute certainty with no possibility for error and probability 1 (or, knowl-
edge and belief), is to interpret the knowledge operator as we showed in Sect. 3.2.1.
Far from being uncontroversial, this definition of a knowledge operator on type spaces
gives rise to interesting properties that make the Ki -operator stronger than the classical
S5-knowledge operator used in computer science and distributed artificial intelligence
(Fagin et al. 1995). This means that all S5-axioms still hold for the Ki -operator, but
Ki also satisfies some additional properties. Although in the single agent case the
S5-knowledge operator and the Ki -operator coincide, the two clearly diverge in the
multi-agent case. As we will immediately see, the main difference from the standard
knowledge operator is made by condition EIC. The following propositions show two
properties satisfied by the Ki -operator but not by the classical S5-knowledge operator.
Proposition 3 For all i, j ∈ N such that i = j , we have EG M Ki K jϕ ↔ ϕ.
Proof (right-to-left). Let i = j . Suppose that M, w  Ki K jϕ. Then, ∀w
′ ∈∼i (w),
M, w′  K jϕ. However, every world u ∈ W belongs to a partition cell of player
j , i.e., ∼ j (u), and, by EIC, for every partition cell ∼ j (u) of player j we have that
∼ j(u)∩ ∼i(w) = ∅. Then, in every partition cell ∼ j(u) of player j there is a world
w′ s.t. M, w′  K jϕ. It means that ∀u ∈ W, M, u  ϕ. Hence, M, w  ϕ.
(left-to-right). Trivial. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 Let pl(a−i ) be defined as pl(a−i ):=
∧
j =i pl(a j ). Then, for all i ∈ N,
we have EG M ♦pl(a−i )↔ K̂i pl(a−i ).
Proof (left-to-right). Suppose that M, w  ♦pl(a−i ). Then, ∃w
′ ∈ W s.t. M, w′ 
pl(a−i ). For each j ∈ N s.t. j = i and for each pl(a j ) ∈ pl(a−i ), by ExIC there
must be a partition cell∼ j(w
′) where ∀u ∈∼ j(w
′), M, u  pl(a j ). By EIC, we have
that: ∀u′ ∈ W, ∼i(u
′) ∩
⋂
j =i ∼ j(w
′) = ∅. Hence, M, w  K̂i pl(a−i ).
(right-to-left). Trivial. ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 says that if a particular action profile pl(a−i ) is possible, i.e., if
pl(a−i ) holds at some world in the model, then player i knows for sure that it is
possible. Proposition 3 on the other hand is a more general and stronger property of
the model: it states that if i and j are different players, then player i knows that player
j knows that ϕ if and only if ϕ is necessary.
Let us spend some words on the meaning of Proposition 3. As it is clear from the
definition of type space given in Sect. 2.2.2, a type for player i provides information
about the ‘psychological situation’ of player i , namely: (i) her actual choice, and (ii)
her subjective probability distribution over possible states. As emphasized above, the
operator Ki should be interpreted as an operator of absolute unrevisable certainty, in
the sense that Kiϕ is true if and only if ϕ is true in all states that player i envisages (or
imagines) as possible. The truth condition of this operator in the type space semantics
given in Sect. 3.2.1 presupposes that for every possible psychological situation of the
other players, player i envisages a state in which this psychological situation occurs. In
other words, player i only excludes from her information set those states in which her
psychological situation is different from her actual psychological situation. Under this
assumption, Proposition 3makes perfect sense. Indeed, let i and j be different players.
The previous assumption implies that, for every possible state t ′′ ∈ T that is not in the
information set of player i at the actual state t , there exists a state t ′ ∈ T in player i’s
information set at the actual state t such that t ′′ is included in player j’s information
set at state t ′. Therefore, clearly, if Ki K jϕ is true at state t thenϕ is true at t too. The
other direction of the equivalence (i.e.,ϕ implies Ki K jϕ) holds for obvious reasons.
3.5.2 Qualitative vs. quantitative type spaces
In Sect. 2.2.2 we have introduced probabilistic type spaces as defined by Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995) and justified this definition on the basis of Harsanyi’s char-
acterization. It is worth noting that Harsanyi’s characterization only holds because
of the properties of probabilities. In particular, in Harsanyi’s type spaces probabili-
ties are σ -additive, and therefore continuous on increasing and decreasing sequences
of events. As shown by Fagin et al. (1999) (see also Fagin 1994; Fagin et al. 1991;
Heifetz and Samet 1998), there is an analogous inductive construction of qualitative
type spaces that does not satisfy the property that all information about other players’
beliefs is captured at level ω, as the construction might need to carry out transfinitely
long. Type spaces studied by Fagin et al. are qualitative: given player i’s basic domain
of uncertainty W 0i = A−i , f0 denotes a member of W
0
i . Each assignment ( f0) rep-
resents a ”possible 1-world”, and the domain of i’s 1-order beliefs is the set of all
possible 1-worlds W 1i . Then, i’s 1-order belief is defined as a set f1(i) ⊆ W
1
i . Induc-
tively, player i’s k-level belief is defined as a set fk(i) ⊆ W
k
i of possible k-worlds,
i.e., k-tuples of functions ( f0, . . . , fk−1). Equivalently, a 1-order belief of i can be
expressed as a function f1(i) : W
1
i → {0, 1}, and i’s k-order belief as a function
fk(i) : W
1
i × · · · × W
k
i → {0, 1}. Specifically, it is shown by Fagin et al. that for
qualitative type spaces it is not necessarily the case that a ω-order belief fω(i) of i
contains information about ω-order beliefs of the other players. In this sense, there is
no simplified definition of qualitative type spaces which is analogous to Definition 3
in Sect. 2.2.2 for quantitative type spaces and which is justified in the light of an
argument à la Harsanyi. However, since we do not use such an inductive construction
of qualitative hierarchies of beliefs and we deal with finitary modal logics, the results
by Fagin et al. are not problematic from our standpoint.
The reason why we have introduced probabilistic (quantitative) type spaces instead
of qualitative type spaces à la Fagin et al. is that in Sect. 6 we will move from a
qualitative representation of epistemic attitudes to a quantitative representation which
requires a probabilistic interpretation in terms of probabilistic type spaces. Thus, we
preferred to state semantic equivalence with respect to a unique type space represen-
tation that applies both to qualitative and quantitative languages. However, it is worth
noting that, as for the interpretation of the qualitative epistemic language with belief
operators given in Sect. 2 and of its extension by knowledge operators given in Sect. 3,
we could have completely omitted the probabilistic aspect of type spaces as defined
in Definition 3 and given an analogous qualitative definition in which functions βi are
replaced by functions β ′i : Ti −→ 2
T−i , where t ′−i ∈ β
′
i (ti ) means that player i’s type
ti considers type t
′
−i possible and, viceversa, t
′
−i /∈ β
′
i (ti ) means that player i’s type ti
considers type t ′−i impossible. The two semantics, the one with functions βi of Defi-
nition 3 and the one in which functions βi are replaced by functions β
′
i , have clearly
the same sets of validities for both qualitative epistemic languages introduced here.
We conjecture that the sets of validities for the two qualitative epistemic languages do
not change if we adopt the qualitative type space semantics à la Fagin et al. in which
type spaces are defined in an inductive way. We postpone the proof of this conjecture
to future work.
4 Axiomatization
In this section we provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics EDGL
and DGL relative to the class of epistemic game models and doxastic game models,
respectively.
Given the equivalences between epistemic game models and type spaces with
respect to EDGL (Corollary 3) and between doxastic game models and type spaces
with respect to DGL (Corollary 1), these axiomatizations will also turn out to be sound
and complete relative to type spaces.
– Axioms for EDGL:
(1) All tautologies of classical propositional logic
(2) Axioms K, T, 4 and B for the universal modality
(a) (ϕ → ψ)→ ( ϕ → ψ)
(b) ϕ → ϕ
(c) ϕ → ϕ
(d) ϕ → ϕ
(3) Axioms K, T, 4 and B for the knowledge modality Ki
(a) Ki(ϕ → ψ)→ (Kiϕ → Kiψ)
(b) Kiϕ → ϕ
(c) Kiϕ → KiKiϕ
(d) ϕ → KiKiϕ
(4) Axioms K and D for the belief modality Bi
(a) Bi(ϕ → ψ)→ (Biϕ → Biψ)
(b) ¬(Biϕ ∧Bi¬ϕ)
(5) Interaction axioms between universal modality, knowledge modality and belief modality
(a) ϕ → Kiϕ
(b) Kiϕ → Biϕ
(c) Biϕ → KiBiϕ
(d) (♦K1ϕ1∧ . . .∧♦Knϕn)→ ♦(K1ϕ1∧ . . .∧ Knϕn)
(6) Axioms for the atomic formulas pl(ai)
(a) ai∈Ai pl(ai)
(b) pl(ai)→¬pl(ai) if ai = ai
(c) pl(ai)→ Bipl(ai)
– Rules of inference for EDGL:
(7) From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ
(8) From ϕ infer ϕ
Fig. 5 Axiomatization of EDGL
Theorem 5 The set of validities of the logic EDGL relative to the class of epistemic
game models (EGM) is completely axiomatized by the principles given in Fig. 5.
Proof Proving that the axioms given in Fig. 5 are sound with respect to the classEGM
and that the inference rules preserve validity is just a routine task and we do not give
it here.
As to completeness, let us define the class of weak epistemic game models
(WEGM) as the class of epistemic models that satisfy the epistemic independence
condition (EIC) but do not necessarily satisfy the adequate valuation condition (AVC)
and the ex interim condition (ExIC). In other words, epistemic game models are a sub-
class ofweak epistemic gamemodels that satisfy both the adequate valuation condition
(AVC) and the ex interim condition (ExIC).
We write WEGM ϕ to mean that the EDGL-formula ϕ is valid relative to the class
WEGM.
Moreover, for any finite set ∆ of EDGL-formulas, we write ∆ WEGM ϕ to mean
that ϕ is a logical consequence of the set of formulas ∆ relative to the class WEGM.
That is,∆ WEGM ϕ iff, for every weak epistemic game model M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n
,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉, if M, w 
∧
ψ∈∆ ψ for allw ∈ W , then M, w  ϕ for allw ∈ W .
The following Proposition 5 highlights that the validity problem relative to the class
EGM is reducible to the logical consequence problem relative to the class WEGM. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5 Let
∆0 =
 ∨
ai∈Ai
pl(ai ) : i ∈ N
∪
{pl(ai )→¬pl(a
′
i ) : i ∈ N and ai , a
′
i ∈ Ai with ai = a
′
i }∪
{pl(ai )→Bi pl(ai ) : i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai }
Then, for every EDGL-formula ϕ, EGM ϕ iff ∆0 WEGM ϕ.
Proof We just need to observe that the (global) axioms in ∆0 force a weak epistemic
game model to satisfy the ex interim condition (ExIC) and the adequate valuation
condition (AVC). That is, M is a weak epistemic game model in which the formula∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ is true (i.e., M, w 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ for all w in M) iff M is an epistemic game
model. Therefore, the class WEGM in which the formula
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ is true coincides
with the class EGM. ⊓⊔
The following Proposition 6 highlights that, thanks to the universal modality ,
the logical consequence problem relative to the class WEGM can be reduced to the
validity problem relative to the class WEGM. The proof of the proposition is trivial,
as we just need to apply the definitions of validity and logical consequence relative to
WEGM.
Proposition 6 For every EDGL-formula ϕ and for every finite set ∆ of EDGL-
formulas, ∆ WEGM ϕ iff WEGM 
∧
ψ∈∆ ψ → ϕ.
The following Lemma 2 provides an axiomatization result for EDGL relative to the
class WEGM.
Lemma 2 The set of validities of the logic EDGL relative to the class WEGM is
completely axiomatized by the groups of axioms (1),(2),(3),(4) and (5) and by the
rules of inference (7) and (8) in Fig. 5.
Proof The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1 The first step consists in providing an alternative semantics for EDGL rela-
tive to the class of enriched weak epistemic game models (EWEGM). An enriched
weak epistemic game model is a tuple M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n,∼, υ〉
where 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 is a weak epistemic game model and ∼ is
an equivalence relation on W such that:
(C1) for all i ∈ N , ∼i⊆∼;
(C2) for all u1, . . . , un ∈ W : if ui ∼ u j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} then ∼1 (u1) ∩
. . .∩ ∼n(un) = ∅.
The truth conditions of EDGL formulas relative to the class EWEGM are exactly
like the truth conditions of EDGL formulas relative to the classes WEGM and EGM,
except for the universal modality  that is interpreted as follows. Let M = 〈W,∼1
, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n,∼, υ〉 be a EWEGM and let w be a world in M . Then:
– M, w  ϕ iff ∀w′ such that w ∼ w′, M, w′  ϕ
Step 2 The second step consists in proving that the set of validities of EDGL relative
to the class EWEGM is completely axiomatized by the groups of axioms (1), (2), (3),
(4) and (5) and by the rules of inference (7) and (8) in Fig. 5.
It is a routine task to check that all principles in Fig. 5 except Axiom (5d) correspond
one-to-one to their semantic counterparts on themodels in the classEWEGM. This can
be easily checked by using the existing algorithm SQEMA (Conradie et al. 2006): for
every axiom in Fig. 5, it allows us to compute the corresponding first-order condition
on the models in the class EWEGM.
In particular, the group of axioms (2) together with the inference rule (8) correspond
to the fact that ∼ is an equivalence relations.3 The group of axioms (3) corresponds
to the fact that ∼i is an equivalence relation, while Axiom (4b) corresponds to the
seriality of the relation→i . ⊓⊔
Remark 1 Note that the necessitation rules for the knowledge modality (i.e., from ϕ
infer Kiϕ) and for the belief modality (i.e., from ϕ infer Biϕ) do not need to be added
to the axiomatization, as they are provable by Axioms (5a), Axiom (5b), the inference
rule (7) and the inference rule (8).4
As to the group of axioms (5) we have the following correspondences: Axiom (5a)
corresponds to the preceding condition C1: ∼i⊆∼; Axiom (5b) corresponds to the
following condition in the definition of epistemic game model:→i⊆∼i ; Axiom (5c)
corresponds to the following condition: for allw, v ∈ W , ifw ∼i v then→i(v) ⊆→i
(w). Because of the reflexivity of the relation∼i the latter is equivalent to the following
condition in the definition of epistemic game model: for all w, v ∈ W , if w ∼i v then
→i(v) =→i(w).
As to Axiom (5d) a bit more work is required. First of all, it is a routine task to
verify that, in termsof correspondence theory,Axiom (5d) corresponds to the following
condition:
(C2∗) for all w, u1, . . . , un ∈ W : if u1, . . . , un ∈∼(w) then there is v ∈ W such that
v ∈∼(w) and ∼i(v) ⊆∼i(ui ) for all i ∈ N .
Secondly, one can prove that the condition C2∗ and the condition C2 are equivalent.
Let us prove first that C2 implies C2∗. Suppose that u1, . . . , un ∈∼ (w). Hence,
by condition C2 and the fact that ∼ is an equivalence relation, ∼ (w)∩ ∼1 (u1) ∩
. . .∩ ∼n (un) = ∅. It follows that there exists v ∈ W such that v ∈∼(w), v ∈∼1
(u1), . . . , v ∈∼n(un). Since every ∼i is an equivalence relation, for every i ∈ N , if
v ∈∼i(ui ) then ∼i(v) =∼i(ui ). Thus, we can conclude that there exists v ∈ W such
that v ∈∼(w) and ∼i(v) ⊆∼i(ui ) for all i ∈ N .
Now let us prove that C2∗ impliesC2. Suppose that ui ∼ u j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
It follows that u1, . . . , un ∈∼(w) for some w. Hence, by condition C2
∗, there are
3 Specifically, Axiom (2b) corresponds to reflexivity of the relation∼, Axiom (2c) to transitivity andAxiom
(2d) to symmetry.
4 Suppose ϕ. Hence, by the inference rule (8), we infer ϕ. Thus, by Axiom (5a) and the inference rule
(7), we infer Kiϕ. Furthermore, by Axiom (5b) and the inference rule (7), we infer Biϕ.
w, v ∈ W such that v ∈∼(w) and ∼i(v) ⊆∼i(ui ) for all i ∈ N . Since every ∼i is an
equivalence relation, for every i ∈ N , if ∼i (v) ⊆∼i (ui ) then ∼i (v) =∼i (ui ). Thus,
we can conclude that there arew, v ∈ W such that v ∈∼(w) and∼i(v) =∼i(ui ) for all
i ∈ N . By the fact that every relation∼i is reflexive, it follows that there arew, v ∈ W
such that v ∈∼(w) and v ∈∼i(ui ) for all i ∈ N . Hence, ∼1(u1) ∩ . . .∩ ∼n(un) = ∅.
It is routine, too, to check that all principles given in Fig. 5 are in the so-called
Sahlqvist class (Sahlqvist 1975). Thus, because of the general Sahlqvist completeness
theorem (cf. Blackburn et al. 2001, Theorem 3.54), they are complete with respect to
the defined model classes.
Step 3 The third step consists in proving that the EDGL-semantics relative to the
class EWEGM and the EDGL-semantics relative to the class WEGM are equivalent.
Specifically, we show that for every EDGL-formula formula ϕ, ϕ is satisfiable in the
class WEGM iff ϕ is satisfiable in the class EWEGM.
(⇒) Let us prove the left-to-right direction. Suppose ϕ is satisfiable in the class
WEGM. Thismeans that there is aweak epistemic gamemodel M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n
,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 and a world w ∈ W such that M, w  ϕ. We can build a corre-
sponding enriched weak epistemic gamemodel M ′ = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n
,∼, υ〉 with ∼= W × W . Clearly, M ′, w  ϕ.
(⇐) Let us prove the right-to-left direction. Suppose ϕ is satisfiable in the
class EWEGM. This means that there is an enriched weak epistemic game model
M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n,∼, υ〉 and a world w ∈ W such that M, w  ϕ.
We can now build a weak epistemic game model M ′ = 〈W ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n,→
′
1
, . . . ,→′n, υ
′〉 that corresponds to M . The construction of M ′ is made in two steps.We
first consider the submodel Mw = 〈Ww,∼1,w, . . . ,∼n,w,→1,w, . . . ,→n,w,∼w, υw〉
generated from M and w (cf. Blackburn et al. 2001, Definition 2.5): by the generated
submodel property (cf. Blackburn et al. 2001, Proposition 2.6) we have Mw, w  ϕ.
Mw is also an enriched weak epistemic game model, and∼w= Ww ×Ww. The latter
means that the operator is interpreted as a universal modal operator. Finally, we can
define M ′ = 〈W ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼
′
n,→
′
1, . . . ,→
′
n, υ
′〉 as follows:
– W ′ = Ww;
– for every i ∈ N , ∼′i=∼i,w and→
′
i=→i,w;
– υ ′ = υw.
It is a routine task to check that M ′ is indeed a weak epistemic game model and, by
induction on the structure of ϕ, that we have M ′, w  ϕ.
Lemma 2 is a consequence of: (i) the equivalence between the EDGL-semantics
relative to the class EWEGM and the EDGL-semantics relative to the class WEGM
(proved in Step 3) and, (ii) the completeness result for EDGL relative to the class
EWEGM (proved in Step 2).
The last element we need for proving Theorem 5 is the following Proposition 7. Let
⊢E DGL ϕ and E DGL ϕ mean, respectively, that the EDGL-formula ϕ is provable
via the groups of axioms (1),(2),(3),(4), (5) and (6) and the rules of inference (7)
and (8) in Fig. 5 and that the EDGL-formula ϕ is provable via the groups of axioms
(1),(2),(3),(4) and (5) and the rules of inference (7) and (8) in Fig. 5.
Proposition 7 For every EDGL-formula ϕ, if E DGL 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ → ϕ then
⊢E DGL ϕ, where ∆0 is defined as in Proposition 5.
Proof SupposeE DGL 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ → ϕ. Hence, ⊢E DGL 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ → ϕ.
By the inference rule (8) (viz. necessitation for ) and the group of axioms (6),
we have ⊢E DGL
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ . By Axiom 2(a), we can derive ⊢E DGL 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ .
Consequently, by the inference rule (7) (viz. modus ponens), we have that ⊢E DGL ϕ.
⊓⊔
Propositions 5, 6 and 7 together with Lemma 2 are sufficient to prove Theorem 5.
Suppose that EGM ϕ. Hence, by Propositions 5 and 6, WEGM 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ → ϕ.
By Lemma 2, it follows that E DGL 
∧
ψ∈∆0
ψ → ϕ. Hence, by Proposition 7,
⊢E DGL ϕ.
As to the logic DGL, namely the fragment of the logic EDGL presented in Sect. 2,
we have the following axiomatization result. We do not prove it here, as the proof
follows the general lines of the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6 The set of validities of the logic DGL relative to the class of doxastic
game models (DGM) is completely axiomatized by the groups of axioms (1), (4) and
(6) and the inference rule (7) in Fig. 5, plus the following axioms and rules of inference
for the belief modality Bi :
– Biϕ → Bi Biϕ
– B̂iϕ → Bi B̂iϕ
– From ϕ infer Biϕ
Note that differently from EDGL, Axioms 4 and 5 as well as the necessitation rule
for the belief modality Bi must be added to the axiomatics, as they are not derivable
from the other principles.
5 Bridge between EDGL and STIT
In this section we propose a bridge between what we have done so far and one of the
most prominent logics of action, namely STIT logic (Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001).
Specifically, we show that the logic EDGL can be linearly embedded into atemporal
individual STIT. More generally, the significance of this result lies in the possibility
of building a connection between the area of epistemic logics and the area of logics
of action.
5.1 Atemporal individual STIT
STIT logic (the logic of seeing to it that) by Belnap et al. (2001) is the logic of sen-
tences of the form “agent i sees to it that ϕ is true”. In Horty (2001) Horty extends
Belnap et al.’s STIT framework by operators of group agency in order to express sen-
tences of the form “the group of agents G sees to it that ϕ is true”. One might use the
terms ‘individual STIT’ and ‘group STIT’ to designate, respectively, Belnap et al.’s
STIT logic, in which only agency operators for the individuals are given, and Horty’s
variant of STIT, with both agency operators for the individuals and agency operators
for the groups. An important distinction in the family of STIT languages is between
‘temporal STIT’ (i.e., STIT with tense operators in the object language) and ‘atem-
poral STIT’ (i.e., STIT without tense operators). A Kripke semantics for atemporal
individual STIT is provided in Balbiani et al. (2008), Herzig and Schwarzentruber
(2008) and Lorini and Schwarzentruber (2011), while an extension of this semantics
to atemporal group STIT is provided inHerzig and Schwarzentruber (2008) and Lorini
and Schwarzentruber (2011)
Here, we build a bridge between EDGL and atemporal individual STIT.
First let us recall the syntax and the semantics of atemporal individual STIT (STIT,
for short). The language LSTIT (P, AGT ) of this logic is built from an infinite set of
atomic formulas P and a finite set of agents AGT = {1, . . . , n} and is defined by the
following grammar:
ϕ :: = p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [i]ϕ | ϕ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ AGT . The construction [i]ϕ is read “agent i sees to it that ϕ is
true regardless of what the other agents choose”. We define the dual of [i] as follows:
〈i〉ϕ:=¬[i]¬ϕ.  is the universal modality and ϕ is read “ϕ is true regardless of
what every agent chooses” or simply “ϕ is necessarily true”.
Definition 6 (STIT-Kripke model Balbiani et al. 2008; Herzig and Schwarzentruber
2008) A STIT-Kripke model SM = 〈W, R1, . . . , Rn, V 〉 is a tuple where:
– W is a countable set of possible worlds;
– R1, . . . , Rn are equivalence relations on W that satisfies the following indepen-
dence of choices condition (ICC):
– R1(w1) ∩ . . . ∩ Rn(wn) = ∅, for every w1, . . . , wn ∈ W ;
– V : W −→ P(P) is a valuation function for atomic propositions;
with Ri (w) = {w
′ : wRiw
′}.
The partition induced by the equivalence relation Ri is the set of possible choices
of the agent i . Indeed, in STIT a choice of an agent i at a given world w is identified
with the set of possible worlds Ri (w). We call Ri (w) the set of possible outcomes of
agent i’s choice at world w, in the sense that agent i’s current choice at w forces the
possible worlds to be in Ri (w). The independence of choices condition (ICC) states
that, whatever each agent decides to do, the set of outcomes corresponding to the joint
action of all agents is non-empty. More intuitively, this means that agents can never
be deprived of choices due to the choices made by other agents.
Example 1 The tuple SM = 〈W, R1, R2, V 〉 defined by:
– W = {w, u, v, r, s, t, z};
– R1 = {w, u, v}
2 ∪ {r, s}2 ∪ {t, z}2;
– R2 = {w, r, t}
2 ∪ {u, v, s, z}2;
– for all p ∈ P, V (p) = ∅.
is a STIT-Kripke model. Figure 6 shows the model SM. The equivalence classes
induced by the equivalence relation R1 are represented by ellipses and correspond to
the choices of agent 1. The equivalence classes induced by the equivalence relation R2
Fig. 6 The STIT-model SM
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are represented by rectangles and correspond to the choices of agent 2. For example,
the choice of agent 1 at world u is {w, u, v} whereas the choice of agent 2 at world
u is {u, v, s, z}. Note that independence of choices condition (ICC) ensures that for
any choice of agent 1 and for any choice of agent 2 the intersection between these
two choices is non-empty. That is, for any equivalence class induced by the relation
R1 and for any equivalence class induced by the relation R2, the intersection between
these two equivalence classes is non-empty.
Given a STIT-Kripke model SM = 〈W, R1, . . . , Rn, V 〉 and a world w in SM, the
truth conditions of STIT formulas are the following:
– SM, w  p iff p ∈ V (w)
– SM, w  ¬ϕ iff SM, w  ϕ
– SM, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff SM, w  ϕ and SM, w  ψ
– SM, w  [i]ϕ iff ∀w′ s.t. wRiw
′, SM, v  ϕ
– SM, w  ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W , SM, v  ϕ
We say that a formula ϕ of the language LSTIT (P, AGT ) is true in a STIT-Kripke
model SM = 〈W, R1, . . . , Rn, V 〉 if ∀w ∈ W we have M, w  ϕ. Then, ϕ is STIT-
valid, denoted by STIT ϕ, if ϕ is true in SM for all STIT-Kripke models SM. Finally,
ϕ is STIT-satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not STIT-valid.
5.2 Truth-preserving embedding of EDGL into STIT
We define the following linear translation tr from LE DGL(G) to LSTIT (P, N ) where
P is a proper extension of Φ (i.e., Φ ⊂ P) and xi is a special atoms in P \ Φ that
allows to identify the worlds in agent i’s belief set (i.e., the worlds in i’s information
set with probability higher than 0):
tr(pl(ai )) = pl(ai ) for pl(ai ) ∈ Φ
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ)
tr(Kiϕ) = [i]tr(ϕ)
tr(Biϕ) = [i](xi → tr(ϕ))
tr(ϕ) = tr(ϕ)
In order to provide an embedding of EDGL into STIT, we need to define the
following STIT formulas which capture four basic assumptions of EDGL:
OneAct:=
(∧
i∈N
∨
ai∈Ai
pl(ai )
)
NoMoreAct:=
(∧
i∈N
∧
ai =a
′
i
(pl(ai )→ ¬pl(a
′
i ))
)
ExInt:=
(∧
i∈N
∧
ai∈Ai
(pl(ai )→ [i]pl(ai ))
)
OneProb:=
(∧
i∈N
〈i〉xi
)
Formula OneAct forces the valuation function to assign at least one action to each
player in each world. Formula NoMoreAct forces the valuation function to assign no
more than one action to each player in each world. Formula ExInt correspond to the
ex interim condition. Finally, formula OneProb forces every player to have at least
one world in his belief set.
The following theorem highlights that the preceding translation provides a correct
embedding of the logic EDGL into the logic STIT.
Theorem 7 A formula ϕ of the language LE DGL(G) is satisfiable relative to the class
of epistemic game models (EGM) iff OneAct∧NoMoreAct∧ExInt∧OneProb∧ tr(ϕ)
is STIT-satisfiable.
Proof We first prove the left-to-right direction of the theorem. Let ϕ be satisfiable
relative to the class of epistemic gamemodels. Thismeans that there exists an epistemic
game model M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 and a world w ∈ W such that
M, w  ϕ. We define a corresponding structure SM = 〈W, R1, . . . , Rn, V 〉 such that:
(i) Ri =∼i for all i ∈ N , (ii) for all pl(ai ) ∈ Φ and for all w ∈ W , pl(ai ) ∈ V (w) iff
pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w), (iii) for all i ∈ N and for all w ∈ W , xi ∈ V (w) iff w ∈→i(w), and
(iv) for all p ∈ P\(Φ∪{x1, . . . , xn}), ||p||
SM = {w ∈ W : p ∈ V (w)} = ∅. It is easy
to check that SM is a STIT-Kripke model and that SM, w  OneAct ∧ NoMoreAct ∧
ExInt ∧ OneProb. Moreover, by induction on the structure of ϕ, we can prove that
SM, w  tr(ϕ). We prove only some cases. The induction basis is clear. Let us prove
the inductive case ϕ = Biψ . Suppose M, w  Biψ . This means that M, w
′  ψ for
all w′ ∈→i (w). Thus, by inductive hypothesis, SM, w
′  tr(ψ) for all w′ ∈ Ri (w)
such that xi ∈ V (w
′). The latter is equivalent to SM, w′  [i](xi → tr(ψ)).
Now, let us prove right-to-left direction. Let OneAct ∧ NoMoreAct ∧ ExInt ∧
OneProb ∧ tr(ϕ) be STIT-satisfiable. This means that there exists a STIT-Kripke
model SM = 〈W, R1, . . . , Rn, V 〉 and a world w in SM such that SM, w 
OneAct∧NoMoreAct∧ExInt∧OneProb∧ tr(ϕ). We define a corresponding structure
M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n,→1, . . . ,→n, υ〉 such that: (i) ∼i= Ri for all i ∈ N , (ii) for
all i ∈ N , →i= {(w,w
′) : wRiw
′ and M, w′  xi }, (iii) for all pl(ai ) ∈ Φ and
for all w ∈ W , pl(ai ) ∈ V (w) iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w). It is easy to check that M is an
epistemic game model, because SM, w  OneAct ∧ NoMoreAct ∧ ExInt ∧OneProb.
Moreover, by induction on the structure of ϕ, we can prove that M, w  ϕ. We prove
only some cases. The induction basis is clear. Let us prove the inductive caseϕ = Biψ .
Suppose SM, w  OneAct ∧ NoMoreAct ∧ ExInt ∧ OneProb ∧ tr(Biψ). The latter
implies that SM, w  [i](xi → tr(ψ)). Thus, for all w
′ ∈ Ri (w) if SM, w
′  xi then
SM, w′  tr(ψ). Hence, by inductive hypothesis, M, w′ | ψ for all w′ ∈→i (w).
Thus, M, w | Biψ . ⊓⊔
6 Probabilistic extension
In this section we want to show how to extend our analysis about the equiva-
lence between Kripke-style semantics and type space semantics for epistemic modal
languages to a modal language with probabilistic beliefs LE PGL(G), interpreted
over a specific class of Kripke models called epistemic–probabilistic game models
(EPGM). The resulting logic EPGL (epistemic–probabilistic game logic) will then be
an extension of the logic EDGL, that was itself introduced as an extension of DGL.
Consequently, this section follows an approach that is incremental with respect to the
logics that have been introduced so far.
6.1 Language
Let us first introduce a probabilistic language LE PGL(G) for epistemic–probabilistic
game logic EPGL, defined by the grammar:
ϕ :: = pl(ai ) | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | P
r
i ϕ | ϕ
where ai ∈ Ai , i ∈ N and r ∈ Q.
The language LE PGL(G) is the language LE DGL(G) of EDGL introduced in
Sect. 3 with the difference of replacing the qualitative belief operator Bi with the
probabilistic belief operator Pri , where P
r
i ϕ has to be read ”player i believes with
probability at least r that ϕ is true”. It is easy to see that this language is incremen-
tal relative to LE DGL(G): the belief operator Bi of LE DGL(G) is expressible in
LE PGL(G) by the operator P
1
i .
6.2 Semantics
6.2.1 Type spaces
The interpretation of the new formulas Pri ϕ in a type space T is as one could expect,
and it is given by the following clause:
– T , t  Pri ϕ iff ∀t
′ ∈ T if t ′i = ti then
∑
t ′−i :T ,t
′
i ϕ
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) ≥ r .
All the other clauses are the same as in Sect. 3. As mentioned before, when r = 1 we
can show the equivalence with respect to the clause for Bi . Indeed,
T , t  Biϕ
iff
∀t ′ ∈ T if t ′i = ti and βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) > 0 then T , t
′  ϕ
iff
∀t ′ ∈ T if t ′i = ti then
∑
t ′−i :T ,t
′
i ϕ
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) = 1
iff
T , t  P1i ϕ.
6.2.2 Epistemic–probabilistic models
When we come to consider how to interpret the language LE PGL(G) over Kripke
models we firstly need to endow the structure with probabilistic belief relations for the
agents. The resulting Kripkemodel will be an epistemic–probabilistic model, formally
defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Epistemic–probabilistic model) An epistemic–probabilistic model is a
tuple M = 〈W,∼1, . . . ,∼n, θ1, . . . , θn, υ〉 where W , ∼i and υ are defined as in
Definition 4, and θi is a function mapping every world w ∈ W to a probability
distribution θi,w over the worlds in ∼i(w) and satisfying the following conditions:
–
∑
w′∈∼i(w)
θi,w(w
′) = 1;
– if w ∼i w
′ then θi,w = θi,w′ .
In order to interpret the languageLE PGL (G) on epistemic–probabilisticmodelswe
want to identify a subclass of them that we call epistemic–probabilistic game models
EPGM.
Definition 8 (Epistemic–probabilistic game model) An epistemic–probabilistic game
model EPGM is an epistemic–probabilistic model that satisfies conditions AVC and
EIC of Definitions 2 and 5, plus the following condition ExIC’:
– Ex interim condition revisited (ExIC’):
∀i ∈ N , ∀w,w′ ∈ W, ∀ai ∈ Ai , if w ∼i w
′ and pl(ai ) ∈
υ(w) then pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w
′).
Now we can give the conditions to interpret the language LE PGL(G) over
epistemic–probabilistic game models EPGM. Apart from Pri -formulas, the truth con-
ditions for all the other formulas remain the same as for EDGM. The clause for
Pri -formulas is as follows:
– M, w  Pri ϕ iff
∑
w′∈∼i(w):M,w
′ϕ θi,w(w
′) ≥ r .
6.3 Correspondence
It is also possible to establish correspondence results between type spaces and
epistemic–probabilistic game models relative to the language LE PGL(G). Given
an arbitrary type space T , the corresponding epistemic–probabilistic model MT
is defined as the tuple MT = 〈W, (∼i )i∈N , (θi,w)i∈N ,w∈W , υ〉 where:
– W = T is the set of worlds;
– υ : W −→ P(Φ) is the valuation function such that pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w) iffσi (ti ) = ai ;
– ∼i is the accessibility relation of player i , given by: ∀w,w
′ ∈ W ,w ∼i w
′ iff ti =
t ′i ;
– θi,w is the probabilistic belief relation of player i at world w, defined as follows:
θi,w(w
′) = r iff βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) = r and ti = t
′
i .
It is easy to see that the Kripke model that we get after the transformation is an
epistemic–probabilistic game model.
Proposition 8 MT is an epistemic–probabilistic game model.
Proof AVC and EIC conditions hold unchanged with respect to EGM. The only thing
that differs from epistemic game models is ExIC’. Then, ExIC’ also holds in MT
since each type is associated with one and only one action and two worlds w and w′
belong to the same partition cell of player i if and only if the type of i atw is the same
as i’s type at w′.
As for DGMand EGMbefore, we conclude the first half of the proof with a theorem
showing that if a formula ofLE PGL(G) is satisfiable in a type spaceT , then it is also
satisfiable in the corresponding EPGM MT .
Theorem 8 Let t ∈ T be a state in T and let w ∈ W be the corresponding world in
MT . For any ϕ in LE PGL(G), if T , t  ϕ then M
T , w  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ. We prove just the case ϕ = Pri ψ since the
others are similar to Sect. 3. SupposeT , t  Pri ψ . Then,
∑
t ′−i :T ,t
′
i ψ
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) ≥ r .
By inductive hypothesis,
∑
w′∈∼i(w):M,w
′ψ θi,w(w
′) ≥ r , hence MT , w  Pri ψ . ⊓⊔
In the second half of the proof the other direction is carried out: we show that
given any epistemic–probabilistic game model M it is possible to associate with it the
corresponding type space T M , and that M and T M are semantically equivalent with
respect to LE PGL(G).
Apart from the probabilistic belief relation θi,w, the construction of the type spaceT
M
is the same as for the case of epistemic game models. What we need to define here is
the belief function βi for player i , given the probabilistic belief relation θi,w of player
i in M . Then, for an arbitrary M = 〈W, (∼i )i∈N , (θi,w)i∈N ,w∈W , υ〉, we can associate
with it the corresponding type space T M = 〈T1, . . . , Tn, β1, . . . , βn, σ1, . . . , σn〉
defined as follows:
– a type ti of player i for each i’s partition cell∼i(w) in M : Ti = {∼i(w) : w ∈ W };
– an action ai of ti specified by υ: σi (ti ) = ai iff pl(ai ) ∈ υ(w);
– a belief function βi such that βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) = r iff θi,w(w
′) = r .
Theorem 9 Let w ∈ W be a world of M and t ∈ T the corresponding state in T M .
For any ϕ in LE PGL(G), if M, w  ϕ then T
M , t  ϕ.
Proof By induction on the structure of ϕ.
We show only the case ϕ = Pri ψ since the others are already covered in Sect. 3. Sup-
pose M, w  Pri ψ . Then, by definition
∑
w′∈∼i(w):M,w
′ϕ θi,w(w
′) ≥ r . By inductive
hypothesis,
∑
t ′−i :T ,t
′
i ϕ
βi (ti )(t
′
−i ) ≥ r , where ti = t
′
i . Hence T
M , t  Pri ψ . ⊓⊔
The following corollary then states that the class of type spaces T and the class of
epistemic–probabilistic game models EPGM are equivalent semantics with respect to
the language LE PGL(G).
Corollary 3 A formula ϕ of LE PGL(G) is satisfiable in T iff it is satisfiable in EPGM.
7 Conclusion
This work aimed at explicitly showing the formal relations between the two main
structures that are used in the literature on epistemic game theory: type spaces and
Kripke models. We started with a language for belief and we proceeded by extending
the language taken into account. We noticed that with respect to belief the relation can
be carried through in a straightforward way, using a rather standard KD45-concept
of belief. When we tried to establish a correspondence with respect to a language
with both belief and knowledge the situation turned out to be more complicated.
Interpreting a S5-concept of knowledge on type spaces in the obvious way gave rise
to some interesting properties (as shown in Sect. 3.5) that the usual S5-knowledge
operator does not have. This means that Kripke models are less demanding towards
the interpretation of knowledge andmore suitable to express both knowledge and belief
at the same time. The kind of knowledge representable in Kripke models is broader
and more general than the interpretation of knowledge in type spaces, whereas the
belief representation is basically the same in both structures.
An important thing to stress is that we axiomatized a qualitative logic for type
spaces. Since Kripke models are normally qualitative structures, we decided to estab-
lish a correspondence from a qualitative point of view in the first place. We then
showed what are the qualitative logics (for belief and for both belief and knowledge)
and the classes of qualitative Kripke models (i.e., doxastic game models and epis-
temic game models respectively) corresponding to type spaces (Sects. 2 and 3). We
presented here the results for a qualitative language with at most two different opera-
tors, Bi and Ki . Using the same line of reasoning we can aim at proving the result for
other epistemic attitudes, like strong belief or defeasible knowledge (Baltag and Smets
2008). What we need to do is to enrich the semantics on the side of Kripke models
by means of plausibility orders or rankings over worlds instead of simple belief sets
(see Baltag and Smets 2008; Spohn 2012). By a further enrichment of Kripke models
towards more fine-grained semantics we finally introduced probabilistic Kripke mod-
els and we extended the correspondence result to the epistemic–probabilistic language
LE PGL(G) (Sect. 6).
Concerning the relationship with STIT logic explored in Sect. 5, a further issue
we plan to study is the relationship between the logic EDGL extended by distributed
knowledge and atemporal group STIT in which agency operators are generalized to
groups of agents.As shownbyHerzig andSchwarzentruber (2008), the latter is nothing
but the product logic S5n (Gabbay et al. 2003).
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